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Abstract—The Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is an 
efficient evaluation technique to identify potential failures in 
products, processes, and services. FMEA is designed to identify and 
prioritize failure modes. It proves to be a useful method for 
identifying and correcting possible failures at its earliest possible 
level so that one can avoid consequences of poor performance. In this 
paper, FMEA tool is used in detection of failures of various 
components of heat exchanger cycle and to identify critical failures of 
the components which may hamper the system’s performance. 
Further, a detailed Pareto analysis is done to find out the most critical 
components of the cycle, the causes of its failures, and possible 
recommended actions. This paper can be used as a checklist which 
will help in maintainability of the system. 
 
Keywords—FMEA, heat exchanger cycle, Ishikawa diagram, 
Pareto analysis, risk priority number. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
EAT exchangers (HEs) are devices which serve as a 
medium for heat exchange between two streams without 
mixing. In HEs, there are basically no work interactions, and 
changes in kinetic and potential energy are negligible for each 
fluid stream. The heat transfer between the two fluids takes 
place within the device and to avoid any heat losses to the 
surrounding medium, the outer shell is well insulated [1].  
The purpose of the HE cycle discussed in this paper is to 
provide hot water which is achieved by heating water at 
ambient temperature with the help of steam. Such cycles are 
widely used in various industries such as hotel industry (hot 
water for geyser), food industry (hot oil for frying), brew 
industry (heat recovery systems), etc.  
The performance of such a cycle is of utmost importance 
and it requires high maintenance. A plate type HE is used in 
the process. 
FMEA is an analytical tool which is widely used to carry 
out the risk analysis of any process. Carrying out FMEA helps 
in identifying the various failure modes and the critical ones. 
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This helps in achieving disturbance free operation of the 
system. 
II. PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
Referring to P&I (Piping and Instrumentation) diagram, the 
process flow is explained below.  
The HE cycle is used to heat water with the help of steam. 
The cycle discussed in the paper proceeds as follows: 
1) At the inlet of steam header, steam at the order of 15 barG 
is available.  
2) Steam is made to enter the system with the help of a 
piston valve. The separator on the line serves the purpose 
of removing any moisture present in steam and sends pure 
steam ahead. 
3) After the separator, a Pressure Reducing Valve (PRV) is 
used to reduce the steam pressure to 8 barG. This is 
required considering the pressure losses in the line and the 
requirements of steam pressure further in the line.  
4) Just after the PRV, a safety valve is installed to ensure 
that 8 barG steam is sent ahead if the PRV fails. The 
safety valve’s set-point is set to 8 barG and it relieves 
pressure when the set-point is crossed.  
5) The maximum inlet pressure to the HE as per design is 3 
barG. To achieve this, an electro-pneumatic control valve 
is used along with Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID) 
controller (D-TRON, Forbes Marshall make). The 
feedback of pressure at downstream of control valve is 
given to PID controller which in turn controls the 
operation of the control valve to maintain 3 barG 
pressure. 
6) Water at ambient temperature is pumped from a water 
tank. A normal water pump is used for this purpose. To 
achieve a stable flow, a piston valve is used to keep the 
flow constant. 
7) The water gets heated through the HE. The feedback of 
the hot water temperature is given to a PID controller 
wherein a set-point is set. Depending on the feedback of 
temperature, the controller regulates the operation of the 
electro-pneumatic control valve.  
8) After the steam passes through the HE, to conserve 
energy, a condensate recovery system is used to convert 
steam into condensate and then to pump it to the drain 
header. 
Such is the process flow of the HE cycle. Several 
components play crucial role in maintaining optimum 
performance of the system. 
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Fig. 1 P&I Diagram 
 
III. FMEA ANALYSIS 
FMEA is a useful tool for planning and performing 
preventive maintenance system in various industries. The 
technique for the first time by reliability engineers was based 
in the 1950s to assess safety of military systems. After this, the 
method quickly spread in the United States and France. The 
method was developed and applied in the early 1960s by 
NASA. Later in the 1980s, the Germans used this technique in 
its chemical and nuclear industries [2]. This method is widely 
used in electronics, chemical and other manufacturing sectors 
for identifying, prioritizing and resolving failures, defects and 
potential problems.  
The FMEA method involves identification of failure modes 
of all components in the system and calculation of Risk 
Priority Number (RPN) for each failure and it is calculated 
from three factors: Severity (S), Occurrence (O), and 
Detection (S) [2].  
 
ܴܲܰ = O∗ ܵ ∗ ܦ                           (1) 
 
Each of the three factors (O, S, and D) are rated on a scale 
of 1 to 10. Occurrence Probability (O) is indicating the 
possibility to occur an incident. Table I shows the criteria for 
the same. 
Consideration of the severity level (S) is very important. If 
severity level is 9 or 10, regardless of RPN, its cause should 
be investigated immediately. Table II shows the criteria for 
deciding the severity of a failure mode. 
TABLE I 
CRITERIA FOR OCCURRENCE PROBABILITY [2] 
Criteria to evaluate Occurrence Probability in 
FMEA method 
Description Scale 
Failure occurrence is very likely  10 
Failure occurrence is likely 9 
Failure occurrence possibility is very high 8 
Failure occurrence possibility is high 7 
Failure occurrence possibility is medium 6 
Failure occurrence possibility is low 5 
Failure occurrence possibility is very low 4 
Failure occurrence possibility is rare 3 
Failure occurrence possibility is very rare 2 
Failure occurrence is unlikely 1 
 
TABLE II 
CRITERIA FOR SEVERITY [2] 
Criteria to evaluate Severity in FMEA method 
Description Scale 
Complete failure of the system 10 
Severe damage to the system 9 
Damage to system is too high 8 
Damage to system is high 7 
Damage to system is medium 6 
Damage to system is low 5 
Damage to system is very low 4 
Minor damage to system 3 
Very minor damage to system 2 
No damage 1 
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Detection probability (D) means how likely an incident or 
failure is discovered after the fact at a specified time. Table III 
shows the criteria for the same.  
 
TABLE III 
CRITERIA FOR DETECTION PROBABILITY [2] 
Criteria to evaluate Detection 
Probability in FMEA method 
Description Scale 
No detection 10 
Negligible 9 
Very Low 8 
Low 7 
Modest 6 
Average 5 
More likely than average 4 
High 3 
Very high 2 
Extremely high 1 
 
Fig. 2 Steps for FMEA [3] 
 
 
Fig. 3 Ishikawa Diagram of failures 
 
The components that play significant roles in the HE cycle 
are as follows: 
1. Control Valve 
2. Piston Valve 
3. Feed Water Pump 
4. Condensate recovery system 
5. PID Controller 
6. Separator 
7. HE 
8. Safety Valve 
9. PRV 
10. Pressure Transmitter (PT) and Temperature Transmitter 
(TT) 
The failures of each component are identified and enlisted 
and the same is represented in the form of an Ishikawa 
diagram as shown above. With the help of failures of 
components, the FMEA sheet is prepared. One of the 
significant features of the FMEA sheet is the RPN which is 
found based on S, O, D values. The values for S, O, D are 
based on judgment and are given with the help of guidance 
from industry experts in the same field. For the FMEA sheet 
prepared in this paper the RPN limit value is considered to be 
125 assuming average value for each parameter S, O, D. From 
(1),  
 
ܴܲܰ = 5 ∗ 5 ∗ 5 ൌ 125 
 
The failures having RPN greater than 125 are considered for 
investigation. 
Table IV is FMEA sheet of various failure of the 
components of the cycle. In the RPN column, the failure 
modes having RPN>125 are highlighted by orange color. The 
failure modes having RPN<125 with their severity of either 9 
or 10 are highlighted by yellow. These highlighted failure 
modes are of importance and should be taken care of. Hence, 
recommended actions are given to assess these failures. 
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TABLE IV 
FMEA SHEET OF HE CYCLE 
Sr. 
No 
Component 
Name Part Function Potential Failure Mode(s) Potential Effect(s) of failures
Existing 
Conditions Recommended Actions 
O S D RPN 
1 HE (HE) 
Heat transfer 
between steam and 
water 
Fouling of Plates Increased Steam Consumption 7 7 3 147 Periodic cleaning of HE plates 
Gasket Failure Fluid Leakage 3 6 2 36  
2 PID 
Display parameter 
values and control 
operation of control 
valves 
Delay to reach zero error Delayed process outcome 6 7 2 84  Overshoot in set-point 6 8 2 96  
Sustained Oscillations No constant process outcome 7 8 3 168 Check the tuning parameters 
Controller not working Set-point not achieved 6 8 3 144 Check wiring continuity and electrical connections 
3 Separator Separate moisture from steam 
Not draining entrained 
moisture Dry steam cannot be supplied 5 7 3 105  
Steam leakage from separator Energy losses, safety will hamper 2 6 9 108  
Erosion of separator Fluid leakage 2 7 3 42  Flange gasket damaged 3 7 3 63  
4 Control Valve 
Control steam 
flow/pressure 
according to set-
points 
Fails to close Redundant fouling of HE 5 5 7 175 Check and replace stem if necessary 
External & Internal 
Corrosion Fluid Leakage 2 6 3 36  
Seat Wear Fluid leakage and valve recession 2 7 4 56  
Stem seizes (sticky 
movement) 
Increase packing wear rate and 
operating friction 3 8 6 144 Ensure smooth movement of stem 
Steam Leakage Energy suit 2 7 3 42  
Stem Leak Steam loss 5 7 3 105  
Valve Hunting Constant Process o/p not achieved 5 8 3 120  
Cavitation Implosion of vapor cavities that produces impinging jets 5 7 3 105  
5 Feed Water Pump 
Pump water from 
water tank to HE 
FWP not pumping No Inlet water 3 10 2 60 
Check all components of FWP 
assembly, replace FWP if needed 
Shaft Failure 2 10 7 140 Replace shaft 
Bearing Failure Noise from FWP 3 5 4 60  
Contactor Failure 
Irregular pumping 
3 9 3 81 Replace contactor 
Magnetic Switch failure 5 9 3 135 Replace magnetic switch 
Impellor failure 4 9 3 108 Replace Impellor 
Leakage 
Less water pumped 
5 8 2 80  
Mechanical Seal Failure 5 8 7 280 Ensure less vibration, proper lubrication, replace if necessary 
6 Safety Valve Release pressure in line above set-point 
Open mode failure Pressure beyond set-point 3 8 2 48  
Closed mode failure Set-point not achieved 3 3 2 18  
7 Piston valve Isolation of outlet from inlet 
Inner wall porosity 
Leakage to outlet 
3 7 4 84  
Improper closing 5 7 4 140 Mention closing torque 
Stack damage 3 7 7 147 Replace softening stacks 
Valve fails to open 
No flow at outlet 
2 9 1 18 Check and remove dirt/burr on spindle 
Spindle failure 2 9 1 18 Apply grease, anti-seize for lubrication 
Bush failure 3 8 3 72  
Upper stack failure Leakage to surrounding 3 6 5 90  Burnishing fault 3 6 5 90  
8 PRV Regulate pressure in line 
Diaphragm failure Inability of PRV to close 3 7 3 63  Seat failure 3 7 3 63  
9 PT/TT Sense and transmit process values Not working 
Incorrect or no signals to 
controller 3 9 6 162 Replace PT/TT 
10 
Condensate 
Recovery 
system 
Pumping of 
condensate using 
steam 
Mechanism stuck Valve does not operate 5 9 2 90 
Check and replace failed component 
if any 
Live steam through exhaust 5 5 3 75  
Improper valve seating Exhaust valve partially open/close 6 5 4 120  
Valve remains partially open Inlet valve partially open/close 6 4 6 144 Clean dirt on valve seat and stem 
Inlet valve opening failure Valve failed in close position 2 9 2 36 Keep steam motive pressure value below recommended value 
Calibration shift Lower Flow rates 3 6 6 108  
Steam Leak Water hammer in discharge lines 5 6 4 120  
   
IV. PARETO ANALYSIS 
Using FMEA, RPNs have been assigned to failures of all 
components. To identify the critical component which can 
hamper performance of HE cycle or lead to downtime, Pareto 
analysis is done. According to the Pareto principle, only few 
factors are responsible for producing most of the problems. 
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80/20 rule is applied in Pareto analysis which states that 80% 
of the key problems are produced by 20% causes. If these 
critical causes are tackled and necessary actions are taken, 
probability of success is higher [4].  
Step I: Pareto analysis of components of HE cycle 
To find out critical component that causes major problems 
in working of HE cycle, Pareto analysis is carried out. For 
that, count is made by taking RPN values > 125 & severity (S) 
of failures (Refer FMEA Sheet) equal to 9 or 10. The 
cumulative count and the % cumulative count are then 
calculated. 
 
TABLE V 
COUNT OF DEFECTS IN COMPONENTS OF HE CYCLE 
Component Name Count Cumulative Count 
% Cumulative 
Count 
Feed Water Pump 6 6 31.58 
Piston Valve 4 10 52.63 
Condensate Recovery System 3 13 68.42 
Control Valve 2 15 78.95 
PID 2 17 89.47 
HE 1 18 94.74 
Pressure & Temperature transmitter 1 19 100 
Separator 0 19 100 
Safety Valve 0 19 100 
PRV 0 19 100 
 
From the above table, Pareto diagram of components of HE 
Cycle is plotted. 
 
 
Fig. 4 Pareto analysis of components of HE cycle 
 
From Fig. 4, it is observed that major problems are caused 
due to failure of feed water pump. Hence, the feed water pump 
is identified as the critical component of the heat exchanger 
cycle. In further steps, necessary actions have to be taken to 
overcome failure due to feed water pump.  
Step II: Pareto Analysis of Failures of Feed Water 
Pump of HE Cycle 
In this step, critical failure of feed water pump which is 
responsible for major problems of feed water pump and 
ultimately HE cycle is to be identified. For this purpose, RPN 
number is taken as count of failures from FMEA sheet. The 
cumulative count and the % cumulative count are then 
calculated. 
TABLE VI 
COUNT OF FAILURES OF FEED WATER PUMP 
Failure of FWP Count Cumulative count 
% Cumulative 
count 
Mechanical Seal Failure 280 280 29.66 
Shaft failure 140 420 44.49 
Magnetic Switch failure 135 555 58.79 
Impellor failure 108 663 70.23 
Contactor failure 81 744 78.81 
Leakage 80 824 87.29 
FWP not working 60 884 93.64 
Bearing failure 60 944 100 
 
From Table VI, Pareto diagram of failures of Feed Water 
Pump is plotted. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Pareto analysis of failures 
 
TABLE VII 
RATING FOR CAUSES OF MECHANICAL SEAL FAILURE 
Cause Rating 
Dry running of pump 9 
Pump vibration 9 
Poor Lubrication 8 
Particle deposition like dirt 7 
Poor Venting 8 
Wearing of seal 7 
Clogging of seal 6 
High pressure in chamber than allowable limit 6 
Excessive temperature due to friction 6 
 
From Fig. 5, it is observed that one of the main causes of 
failure of Feed Water Pump is mechanical seal failure. 
Ultimately, mechanical seal failure is responsible of majority 
problems in the working of HE cycle. 
Hence, 20% causes responsible for 80% problems of HE 
cycle are obtained using the above Pareto analysis. 
Step III: To find causes of Mechanical seal failure 
In this step, further 'Root Cause Analysis' is done to find out 
causes of mechanical seal failure of feed water pump. Major 
causes of mechanical seal failure of Feed Water Pump are [5]: 
 Pump vibration 
 Dry running of pump 
 Poor lubrication 
 Particle Deposition like dirt 
 Poor venting 
 Wearing of seal 
 Clogging of seal 
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 High pressure in chamber than allowable limit 
 Excessive temperature due to friction 
Now, by rating these causes of failure on the scale of 1-10, 
priority can be given to overcome mechanical seal failure of 
feed water pump. 
From Table VII, it can be concluded that, dry running of 
pump is a major cause of mechanical seal failure, and hence, 
necessary actions should be taken to overcome the same. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The work shows the FMEA study of HE cycle. With the 
help of Ishikawa diagram, the failures are listed for each 
component of the cycle. Based on the RPN analysis, it is 
evident that the feed water pump is the most vital component 
of the HE cycle and should be addressed first. Further Pareto 
analysis shows that the mechanical seal failure is the most 
critical failure in the feed water pump. All the possible causes 
of this failure are listed as per their rating. Thus, this paper can 
serve as a checklist for identification of failure modes, their 
effects and the causes of the most critical failures in the HE 
cycle. This would in return help in maintainability of the 
system. 
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